The U.S. Treasury Department in late July issued the largest Iran-related sanctions action since 2018, targeting a shipping network connected to Iranian elites. One of the companies singled out was Draco Buren Shipping Pte. Ltd., a Singapore-based “shadow fleet” operator with at least 25 vessels, including the whimsically named and newly sanctioned Pinocchio, Moana and Simba.
A Kharon investigation into Draco Buren’s oil-shipping fleet uncovered a broader constellation of actors, reaching as far as Chinese state-owned enterprises. The network provides a more complete picture of the layered ownership, management and counterparty relationships that underpin sanctions evasion.
And it reflects how enforcement battles over Iran and Russia are increasingly entangling the global shipping industry.
Backdrop: The disruption of maritime networks that funnel oil wealth to Russia and Iran is a key focus of the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) sanctions program.
The network reshuffled almost immediately: Corporate records show that nearly all of the Marshallese companies were annulled the day their vessels were designated.
Key partner: Draco Buren’s former owner is now director of a closely related Singaporean company, Sea Lead Shipping Pte. Ltd. Of the 16 Draco Buren vessels that OFAC targeted, Sea Lead co-operates 15.
Two of the vessels, the Rantanplan and Bigli, highlight how ostensibly separate Hong Kong ownership structures can converge through shared addresses and service providers. Both vessels’ owners, which are domiciled in Hong Kong, list Sea Lead’s address as their contact on maritime compliance and inspection records—an address that’s also linked to numerous dissolved Marshallese vessel owners.
One of these vessels is the cargo ship Corn, and according to a maritime registry, two additional Hong Kong-registered firms are also involved in that ship’s management, underscoring the layered and cross-jurisdictional structures used to sustain operations despite sanctions exposure.
Kharon had previously investigated one of those Hong Kong companies, Ocean Searum One Limited, and traced its upstream ownership to Chinese state-owned enterprises and units of the Chinese government.
A Kharon investigation into Draco Buren’s oil-shipping fleet uncovered a broader constellation of actors, reaching as far as Chinese state-owned enterprises. The network provides a more complete picture of the layered ownership, management and counterparty relationships that underpin sanctions evasion.
And it reflects how enforcement battles over Iran and Russia are increasingly entangling the global shipping industry.
Backdrop: The disruption of maritime networks that funnel oil wealth to Russia and Iran is a key focus of the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (OFAC) sanctions program.
- In its July 30 news release, Treasury said that Draco Buren managed as many as 21 vessels, including container ships and crude oil tankers, in the network of Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, the son of an Iranian admiral and top political advisor.
- More sanctions against Iran are looming. Unless a new nuclear agreement is struck, the United Nations’ pre-2015 measures are poised to snap back into place before the end of the month.
The network reshuffled almost immediately: Corporate records show that nearly all of the Marshallese companies were annulled the day their vessels were designated.
Key partner: Draco Buren’s former owner is now director of a closely related Singaporean company, Sea Lead Shipping Pte. Ltd. Of the 16 Draco Buren vessels that OFAC targeted, Sea Lead co-operates 15.
Two of the vessels, the Rantanplan and Bigli, highlight how ostensibly separate Hong Kong ownership structures can converge through shared addresses and service providers. Both vessels’ owners, which are domiciled in Hong Kong, list Sea Lead’s address as their contact on maritime compliance and inspection records—an address that’s also linked to numerous dissolved Marshallese vessel owners.
- Red flag: When vessels and their owners or operators appear under recycled corporate addresses, a tactic flagged in U.S. maritime advisories, it suggests these entities may be structured to evade sanctions, obscure detection or facilitate risky trade.
One of these vessels is the cargo ship Corn, and according to a maritime registry, two additional Hong Kong-registered firms are also involved in that ship’s management, underscoring the layered and cross-jurisdictional structures used to sustain operations despite sanctions exposure.
Kharon had previously investigated one of those Hong Kong companies, Ocean Searum One Limited, and traced its upstream ownership to Chinese state-owned enterprises and units of the Chinese government.
Kharon users can explore the Draco Buren network through the ClearView platform.
- Of note: China has become Russia’s top oil importer, and the U.S. this year has sanctioned Chinese “teapot” refineries for purchasing and processing Iranian oil, too. But this network demonstrates how China’s private sector and state-owned enterprises are involved in and profiting from the entire process, including transportation.
According to vessel inspection documents, Draco Buren at the time of its designation co-operated a Liberian-flagged oil tanker with Copenhagen-based Handytanker K/S; that’s a subsidiary of Maersk, one of the world’s largest container shipping companies.
- At the time, Handytanker also shared an address with the Marshallese front company that still owns the tanker.
The tanker has since re-flagged and changed management.
Three takeaways:
Three takeaways:
- The speed at which the Draco Buren network and others like it dissolve, rebrand and shift operational control underscores how sophisticated and resilient sanctions evasion has become.
- For the public sector, that reorganization shows the limitations of enforcement by designations alone.
- For industry, it reinforces the compliance red flag posed by opaque maritime webs—stretching even to China—designed to move sanctioned goods.
More from the Kharon Brief:
