Guide

Understanding Remote Access Controls: The AI Remote Access Rule and the Remote Access Security Act

Export ControlsSemiconductorsAI
Kharon team

Kharon Staff

·4 min

Ai remote access rule remote access security act
The U.S. Department of Commerce is reportedly finalizing a rule that would bar Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) companies from remotely using advanced AI chips housed in data centers outside China, extending Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) controls to seven more countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. At the same time, the bipartisan Remote Access Security Act (RASA), which passed the House in January and awaits Senate action, would amend the Export Control Reform Act to explicitly give BIS statutory authority to regulate cloud and network access to controlled U.S. items, including chips already deployed. Together, this dual regulatory and legislative push means that for chip suppliers, cloud providers, and data center operators, the compliance question now extends past where a chip ships to who can run workloads on it.

What Is the Remote Access Loophole?

Remote access allows a user to run workloads on chips located elsewhere, including through rented cloud infrastructure. U.S. export controls bar shipping the most advanced chips to China but have generally not barred Chinese companies from renting their computing power in the United States or in third countries. The chip never has to cross a border. 

The gap has three parts:

Legal: The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) control exports, reexports, and in-country transfers, and none of those terms clearly covers access over a network. In a January 2009 advisory opinion, BIS concluded that providing computational capacity through grid or cloud computing is not subject to the EAR, and it reaffirmed that position in 2014. Cloud providers have built compliance programs around it.

Operational: Even where license conditions apply, a provider sees the account holder, not necessarily the company behind it. Offshore subsidiaries and resellers can stand between a data center and the ultimate parent that uses its compute.

Geographic: Exports of advanced chips to most data centers in Southeast Asia do not require a license unless the customer or its ultimate parent is headquartered in China or another Country Group D:5 destination, or in Macau. ByteDance, Alibaba, and Tencent have reportedly used advanced U.S. chips this way through data centers in Thailand, Malaysia, and Japan, CNBC reported in August 2026.

What Is the AI Remote Access Rule?

The Information reported on Nov. 11, 2026, citing two people familiar with the matter, that the rule has two main parts. Exports of Nvidia Blackwell-class or more advanced chips to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Norway, and South Africa would require a license, and importers would have to tell Commerce who receives the chips and how they are used. Data centers run by U.S. companies in those countries could skip the license by blocking remote access from arms-embargoed countries such as China and Russia and reporting their local customers and computing capacity, an exemption that locally owned operators would not receive as reported.

As of Nov. 12, 2026, BIS has not published the rule, and its final requirements and effective date are not yet known. Commerce is consulting with other agencies before finalizing it, according to the same report. Until the rule appears in the Federal Register, the reported country list and chip thresholds remain unconfirmed, as does whether the rule would reach existing cloud contracts.

What Is the Remote Access Security Act (RASA)?

Congress is pursuing a separate route. The Remote Access Security Act (H.R. 2683) would amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) to make remote access a controlled activity alongside export, reexport, and in-country transfer. The House passed the bill 369-22 on Jan. 12, 2026, and it awaits action in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, where senators introduced a companion bill, S. 3519, on Dec. 17, 2025. The Senate version would reach only items on the Commerce Control List, accessed through a cloud infrastructure service by a “foreign person of concern,” meaning governments, entities, and persons tied to China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea, and its remote access authority would expire after 10 years. The House-passed bill defines remote access more broadly:
“access on a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent basis to an item subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under this Act by a foreign person through a network connection, including the internet or a cloud computing service, from a location other than where the item is physically located if the Secretary determines that the use of the item could pose a serious risk to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.”
Four features of that definition would shape compliance programs:
  • Negligence is enough: The definition covers negligent access as well as knowing or purposeful access. The bill states that this does not lower the intent required for criminal liability, but records showing how users were vetted would carry more weight in any enforcement review.
  • Foreign person, not foreign location: The trigger is who accesses the item, not where the server sits, which extends the logic of the deemed export rule to the network.
  • A risk determination comes first: Controls would apply only where the Secretary of Commerce finds that use of an item could pose a serious risk to U.S. national security or foreign policy, which points to targeted rules rather than licensing for all cloud services.
  • Licensing and enforcement: BIS could require licenses for remote access and bring enforcement actions against U.S. and non-U.S. parties that provide it.

How the Rule and the Remote Access Security Act Fit Together

The reported rule is the near-term tool, and the Remote Access Security Act would give it firmer legal footing. Without the bill, BIS main lever over remote access is the license for the physical shipment, because ECRA does not clearly reach access itself. Its catch-all and U.S.-person controls reach cloud activity, but generally only where there is knowledge that it will support a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or military-intelligence end use. That is why the reported exemption turns on blocking access rather than licensing it. If the bill becomes law, BIS could regulate access directly, including access to chips already installed. If it does not, capacity deployed before the rule could remain outside its reach, and a rule that relies on shipment licenses to restrict access could face legal challenge.

Who Would Be Affected

Both measures would move the compliance checkpoint from the shipping dock to the account login: whichever party grants access would need to know who is using it.

Organization type

Main exposure

What would change

Cloud and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) providers


Granting access to restricted users

Due diligence to each customer’s ultimate parent, access controls and logging, and possible licensing

Data center operators in the seven reported countries


New license requirements for advanced chips

Disclosure of chip recipients and uses; only U.S.-run sites would reportedly qualify for the access-blocking exemption

Chipmakers and resellers


Licensed or lost demand in new license countries, and downstream diversion

End-use certifications from buyers before shipment

Software and software-as-a-service (SaaS) vendors


Remote use of controlled software, if BIS applies new authority beyond chips

Classification of hosted functionality, not only downloads

Universities and research labs


Overseas collaborators using hosted accelerators

Screening of foreign users on shared computing clusters

What Requirements Already Apply

BIS confirmed in guidance issued May 31, 2026, that a license is required to export certain advanced computing items to entities headquartered in China or another Country Group D:5 destination, or in Macau, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered there, even when the recipient is located elsewhere. The requirement took effect Nov. 17, 2023, and BIS said its non-enforcement of the January 2025 Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion does not affect it. The same guidance states that bona fide data center operators otherwise acting consistently with the EAR need not stop the ongoing use or servicing of advanced computing items because of it, until further notice. The headquarters test governs who receives the chips. It does not by itself reach an independently owned data center outside China that rents capacity to a Chinese customer, which is the gap the reported rule targets.

Separately, BIS moved license applications for certain chips, such as the Nvidia H200, to case-by-case review for exports from the United States to end users in China and Macau in a final rule effective Jan. 15, 2026, subject to conditions. Reexports to those destinations, and exports to entities headquartered in Country Group D:5 or Macau but located elsewhere, remain under a presumption of denial. Applicants must describe the ultimate consignee’s know-your-customer (KYC) procedures for preventing remote access by restricted parties and list any intended IaaS remote end users headquartered in China, Macau, or six other listed destinations, or headquartered there or with an ultimate parent headquartered there. These are license conditions, not a general ban on cloud access by Chinese customers.

BIS has also warned that its catch-all controls may require a license when an exporter knows that an IaaS provider will use advanced chips to train AI models for or on behalf of parties headquartered in Country Group D:5 (including China) or Macau, where the models may support WMD or military-intelligence end uses. Kharon analyzed that guidance when BIS issued it in May 2025. BIS’s diversion guidance treats an IaaS customer that cannot affirm that its users are not headquartered in China as a red flag, along with a customer that refuses to disclose where it or its ultimate parent is headquartered.

What Exporters and Data Center Operators Should Review Now

Practical preparation starts with the parties behind a sale or computing relationship:
  • Identify the buyer, intermediaries, and intended end users, including arrangements involving resold computing capacity.
  • Confirm where each customer and its ultimate parent are headquartered, across every corporate layer.
  • Review military end-use, restricted-party, and diversion indicators alongside hardware classification and applicable license conditions.
  • Obtain written attestations from IaaS customers that they do not provide access for training AI models on behalf of parties headquartered in Country Group D:5 (including China) or Macau, as BIS’s diversion guidance recommends.
  • Document unresolved red flags and reassess relationships when ownership or customer information changes.

Assessing Remote Access and Diversion Risk with Kharon

The difficult question in a remote access case is who stands behind a data center’s customers, starting with where each customer and its ultimate parent are headquartered. Kharon maps the ownership and commercial relationships of parties that may be subject to export controls restrictions.

Explore Kharon’s semiconductor export compliance solutions.

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